Studies of electoral behaviour tend to focus on party choice. When it comes to highprofile single candidate elections, such as those for president in the US, there is a recognition that the party label is not all that matters and that personal attributes of the candidates have an importance independent of party. Yet there is a significant and growing literature that argues that candidates themselves should be and are important sources of votes in many countries and in much less significant elections. Candidates may attract support for who they are, or what they have done, or what they might do, rather than simply because of the party to which they belong. There are good institutional reasons for this. Under certain electoral systems, individual candidates have a strong incentive to differentiate themselves from others in their party and to develop a personal following. In a widely cited article, Carey and Shugart (1995) explained how this stimulus would be higher where the vote was cast for a candidate and not a party and where that vote had a significant effect not just on which parties won seats but on which candidates did so (see also Katz, 1986; Marsh 1985b ). Many states use multi-member electoral systems that provide particularly strong incentives, including Finland, Switzerland and the Irish Republic, 1 while many others, including mixed member systems such as New Zealand, and single member plurality systems, including Britain, the US and Canada, provide some encouragement for candidates to seek personal support.
Despite the interest in how electoral systems may lead rational politicians to develop a personal following there has been relatively little work designed to find out the extent to which they are able to do this, and much of that has been by inferencecomparing votes won by different politicians -rather than by direct measurement using voter surveys. For example, Moser and Scheiner (2005) assess the extent of personal voting in several mixed member systems by comparing list and candidate votes for the same party. 2 In single member district electoral systems there is an extensive literature looking at how far incumbency seems to confer an advantage and seeing such effects as indicating a degree of personal voting (e.g. Cain et al 1987; Bean 1990; Kashinsky and Milne 1986; Wood and Norton, 1992; Gaines 1998) ).
Swindle ( variation may well indicate that voters do discriminate between candidates from the same party it does not show whether the vote for the party increases in consequence.
It could well be that personal voting is nested within, and so subsidiary to, party voting. Taking an even more indirect tack, Shugart et al. (2005) explore the hypothesis that personal voting is higher in some countries than others by identifying symptoms of personal voting: the incidence of candidates born locally or with local representative experience. Karvonen (2002) also looks for aggregate symptoms of personal voting, such as higher legislative turnover and more electoral volatility.
Canadian respondents have been asked to judge the importance of candidates, leaders, issues and the local candidate in their vote decision; between 20 and 30 percent said the local candidate was the most important factor over the period 1965-79, fewer than chose parties or leaders (Irvine, 1982: 761) . The personal qualities of candidates appear to weigh more heavily in the minds of Finnish voters. Voters were asked whether candidate was a more important factor in their voting decision than party. Only a small majority of the respondents said that party is more important (Raunio 2004: 5) .
3 Karp et al., (2002) take a more indirect approach, still using survey data. They examine the weighting of candidate ratings within a multivariate model, including ratings of all candidates as well as measures of party attachments and other variables.
They argue that much split ticket voting in New Zealand's mixed-member system is largely the result of personal voting -a conclusion echoed by Moser and Scheider (2005) . Blais et al. (forthcoming) have taken this sort of analysis a stage further by simulating choices in which candidates do not matter and comparing them to actual ones. They first estimate the impact of candidate evaluations on the vote in Canada and then pose the counterfactual question: how many people would vote the same way if candidate evaluations were all the same? From their simulation, using a multivariate model with all candidate evaluations subsequently set to zero, they conclude that the impact of this would be small, with only 6 percent of Canadians voting differently. This is in striking contrast to earlier survey evidence and indicates a much lower level of personal voting in that country than is suggested by asking people directly (Irvine 1982) Much of this work consists of single country studies. Shugart argues that comparative work in this area has been limited by the unavailability of comparative p. 5 data (2005: 49-50) . While there is now extensive data available on parties and elections there is little on candidates, and hence limited resources to explore personal voting. Nor is it clear how this can be done in a way that provides equivalence across countries. 4 To suggest that we need more survey data begs the question of whether, and if so how, surveys can identify candidate-centred voters. What sort of items might be used to identify those who cast a personal vote? This paper contributes to the wider literature by providing a detailed case study of possible measures using the Irish Republic, where elections are fought using a strong preferential voting system, the single transferable vote (STV) (see below). STV makes candidate-centred voting compatible with party voting to a degree that is unusual. It appears to provide a significant stimulant to politicians to develop and seek support on a personal basis but, as Bowler and Farrell point out, 'while it may make sense to assume that candidates spend time and effort on "pork-barrel" and "constituency service" politics, this is no guarantee that this is the basis for voting behaviour at the level of the electorate ' (1991: 347) . In what follows we will show that there is ample evidence that for many voters the candidate rather than the party is the key to their decision on Election Day.
There has been much discussion on the respective importance of parties and candidates in Irish elections. Conventional wisdom certainly sees the personal vote as extremely important. Candidates themselves pander to and help to create a demand for personal service and they campaign strongly for their own personal preference votes, as a number of studies have demonstrated (see Komito and Gallagher 2005) .
There has been less analysis of the voters themselves and the limited evidence does not tell a coherent story. Some candidates from a party are more successful than others -in many cases despite efforts by parties to ensure their support is distributed evenly (Marsh, 2000; Swindle, 2002) . Opinion surveys and exit polls have asked people about the relative importance of party and candidate in their decision and the most important factor for up to half of all voters has been the candidate (Mair 1987; Sinnott 1995; King 2000) . This has been underlined in recent years by the growing success of non-party candidates in general elections. Even so, there is an obvious conflict between the opinion poll evidence, which suggests that candidate-centred reasons lie behind many first preference votes, and the hard data on election results, which testify to a considerable stability in party support (Mair and Marsh 2004) . One
problem has been the ambiguity of the opinion poll evidence, not least because many voters may choose candidates from within a party (Mair, 1987: 92) . Until recently it was not possible to look beyond the evidence of scattered opinion polls; however, with the fielding of the first full election study in 2002 information is now available to explore the respective weight of party and candidate much more fully.
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The results of the exploration will be significant in three ways. Firstly, an extensive examination using a variety of measures will clarify extent to which personal voting is prevalent in Ireland, something that is indicated by theory but not confirmed satisfactorily by the evidence to date. The assessment of the various types of evidence and measures is also an important step towards comparative study since it provides a basis for evaluating different possible approaches -which themselves may have been developed because of system variations. In particular, we will compare the inferences that can be made from reported behaviour with assessments by respondents of their own motives.
Secondly, assessing the extent of personal voting is significant for our understanding of the process of electoral democracy. It is common to assume that , the electorate makes parties responsible for government but it makes little sense to look for reasons why a particular voter supported a party if that voter was rather supporting a particular candidate and would have done so whatever that candidate's party label. This paper thus examines what (Irish) voters are doing when they vote. In general terms: are they selecting parties, or are they selecting candidates? If the former is the case, they could also be voting for a government, or a party leader, but either way they are behaving in a manner comparable to voters in most other countries. 6 If they are selecting candidates then our interpretation of Irish voting behaviour will have to be rather different. This would not be to conclude that Irish voters are driven by personality. On the contrary, they could be motivated by concerns about issues and performance in just the same way that party-centred voters can be, but those concerns would have to be linked by voters to candidates as individuals, not as representatives of parties.
Thirdly, identifying the object of electoral choice is important for the ways in which we explain electoral behaviour. Our explanations normally assume that voters are thinking about and choosing between parties but, as we have seen, there is good reason to think that at least some of them are thinking about candidates. It seems p. 7 possible that one of the reasons why electoral behaviour in Ireland is hard to explain using the models developed elsewhere is that many voters ignore 'party'. In an oftencited paper Rivers (1990) warned those exploring electoral behaviour using multivariate models about the assumption of homogeneity that underlies such models.
When heterogeneity is ignored, the resulting coefficients may well be seriously biased. While one set of solutions to this heterogeneity has been primarily methodological, using more appropriate statistical techniques to cope with invalid assumptions, the main, more substantive issue, raised by Rivers is to identify the various sources of heterogeneity.
We will examine several types of evidence on the relative importance of candidates and parties in this paper, using data from the 2002 election study, the first of its kind in the Republic. Firstly, we will describe the Irish electoral system and explain how it promotes candidate-centred voting. Secondly, we will examine how voters actually fill in their ballots. The main objective here is to assess how far voters focus more on candidates than parties, not to explain why they do so. The latter question is also an important one as the discussion above explains. It is also one that must be answered if we are to understand political competition, and not just in Ireland. However, we must first ascertain the extent to which people do vote for candidates rather than parties and compare and evaluate methods of assessing how important parties and candidates are to each individual voter. This is the central task of this paper. We will also see how to scan a list of around a dozen or more candidates carefully if he or she is to organise all their preferences along party lines.
Making the ballot
All respondents were provided with something very like the ballot they would have been faced with on Election Day and asked to fill it in as they did at that time.
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Respondents were also offered the option of filling in the ballot and placing it in a sealed envelope. Eighty-nine percent of all respondents and 92 percent of those who claimed to have voted filled in the ballot. Using this evidence we will examine how they did so. This involves scrutinising not simply first preferences but second, third and lower preferences and exploring the extent to which people appear to vote for parties as opposed to candidates. We will discuss different ways in which the importance of the party label might be manifested in the preferences and show how different definitions can lead to different conclusions about the role of party.
What sort of pattern would we find if party were the dominant criterion for voters? There has been considerable analysis of the patterns of voting using the aggregate material at constituency level available from official results, which indicates a strong degree of voting on party lines as a high percentage of votes tend to be transferred between candidates of the same party (see for instance Gallagher 1978 Gallagher , 1993 Gallagher ,1999 Gallagher , 2003 Marsh 1981; Sinnott 1995) . However, the information this gives is limited to those votes that do transfer. Moreover, the original preference of those voters whose vote is transferring can soon be lost. Ideally we would know how each voter voted and this is what our simulated ballot tells us. In a pioneering analysis of such data, drawn from European Parliament elections and by-elections, Bowler and Farrell (1991a; 1991b) discussed how the information from simulated ballots could shed light on the importance of party (see also King 2000) . The strongest sign that party matters would be that whenever a voter voted for a candidate he subsequently voted for all the other candidates of that party in sequence. Party would clearly be the dominant criterion. Candidate preferences could well matter, but only nested within party preference. Whether or not this should also be confined to one party is a matter for debate but if we apply the criterion all the way down the ballot very few voters would be classified as party-centred. A similar, if weaker, sign would be that all the running mates of the first placed candidate are supported before any other candidate. giving their first preference to Fianna Fáil cast a complete and sequential ballot -akin to the classic 'straight-ticket'. The figure is lower for the other parties, but more than two out of every five supporters of those parties cast a complete and sequential ballot.
Forty-four percent of those casting their first preference for a party running more than one candidate cast a vote for all that party's candidates before expressing any other preferences. Moreover, many of the departures from a strict sequence are small, involving the interpolation of a single candidate. Overall most first preference votes for parties translate into votes for the whole party slate, and the majority of the latter are cast in sequence. While this still allows for a considerable degree of candidatecentredness within the party slate, it does imply that party is the most important element for a large number of voters.
INSERT TABLE 1: DEGREE OF PARTY-CENTRED VOTING Bowler and Farrell (1991a; 1991b) suggest another way to look at the influence of party on the way people fill in the ballot. This involves an examination of the extent to which voters cast a vote for two successive candidates of the same party.
Each preference set can be seen as a number of pairs -1 and 2, 2 and 3, 3 and 4 and so on -and each can be seen as either a pair from the same party or from different parties. A strong partisan structure would show a high number of party consistent pairs; a weak structure would show a low number, or none at all. This offers a potentially more nuanced measure of partyness using a summation of the number of party pairs, but voters give different numbers of preferences and again, there is the problem that many parties run no more than one candidate in any constituency, and that different constituencies have different numbers of party-consistent options.
Limiting analysis to just the first pair, the third row in Most answers fall into one of four categories: personal characteristics of the candidate, the area the candidate comes from, the party of the candidate and the candidate's policies. The first set is essentially personal: the voter knows the candidate, the candidate is 'good', the 'best candidate', is 'honest' or 'sincere'. This is not to say that performance does not matter: many see the candidate as a 'good worker', or a 'hard worker', or as someone who has been 'helpful' to the voter. The second set of answers highlight local representation: the candidate is from the area, or has been good for the area, and has a 'good record' in the area or is a 'good worker' for the area. The third set is essentially partisanship, giving the party of the candidate as the key reason. Finally, there are 'policy' justifications, citing the views or opinions of the candidate. Other reasons include a view that the candidate represented particular interests (farmers, workers, business or the elderly), tactical or strategic voting, and vague reference to family factors that are not clearly either personal or party. Table 2 shows the distribution of these motives across the sample, and shows firstly, the main reason given and secondly, all reasons, including subsidiary ones.
When asked, people appear to see candidates in terms of who they are and what they have done rather than their party or policy. Half of all respondents who gave any reason provided an essentially personal justification and only one-in-five spontaneously mentioned party. However, it is obvious that in some instances a respondent might feel partisanship would be an inappropriate answer. Anyone voting This analysis suggests that most voters appear to be attracted by the personal characteristics and attributes of the candidates themselves rather than by their party.
However, it is arguable that this evidence understates the importance of party. As we have seen, the numbers of candidates put up by a party has an impact on the way the question is answered. There are few instances of single candidate situations for Fine
Gael and none for Fianna Fáil. It may also be that 'party' is a response which may be unacceptable to many who feel parties have a low reputation in general and that they will appear more conscientious if they can give apparently more informed reasons for their support. Finally, the stress in the question on the choice of candidate may also Asking people to voice their reasons for making any choice is problematic as people may in reality make decisions without thinking through the sorts of criteria they are asked to consider. They may also be unaware of the way in which certain predispositions may impact on their evaluations of the choices offered. While these direct questions are useful they should not be seen as definitive. Ranking is also less than ideal, as we do not know whether a primary reason clearly outweighs a secondary one, or whether the margin is a small one. Questions that ask respondents to rate several things on a scale can be more nuanced and so more useful. Much electoral research is based on asking people to rate stimuli -leaders, issues, performances and so on -on a number of scales and the most important factors in vote choice are then inferred from the pattern of correlations. This may be a simple enough exercise where there are only 2 or 3 parties; it is much more time-consuming where there may be up to 17, as is the case with candidates. However, we asked our respondents to rate each of the parties and each of the candidates from those parties on a thermometer scale.
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We feared that independent and minor party candidates would be particularly difficult for respondents to evaluate and so excluded such candidates from this part of the survey. If voters are to decide on the basis of candidates rather than parties it is vote that is different from that they give to the candidate. Table 6 shows the average rating of the first preference candidate and the average rating of the party of that candidate, again broken down by party.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE We can also use this indirect measure to explore lower preferences. This is shown in Table 7 for the first three preferences. Looking first at all voters in column 1 we see that candidates obtaining a first preference are rated more highly than their Comparison is confined here to the group of voters analysed in Table 1 : those who did not vote for an independent and who could vote for at least two candidates of their We will revisit this point below.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
There is not space here to explore in any detail who are the more candidatecentred voters. 20 They key point is that there is evidence based on a variety of methods that suggest importance of party in the voting decision varies considerably within the Irish electorate. In the last section of this paper we want to explain the implications of this for our explanations of Irish voting behaviour.
Explaining electoral choice
We will do this by examining the performance of what we argue is a typical multivariate model of party choice across different types of voters, differentiated by the extent to which they are candidate rather than party centred. Before we discuss the p. 19 model we must explain how such a differentiation is made. We could simply pick one of the several measures discussed above. However, on the assumption that these measures all tap the same phenomenon, it makes more sense to combine them into a single measure. This can be done using factor analysis, which also gives us some indication of how far each of the measures reflects the same phenomenon. If they do, the factor analysis will indicate that a single dimension could underlie all 'responses'. Table 9 displays the results of two principal factor analyses. The first includes almost all of the items identified in tables 1-6, 21 the second those which loaded reasonably well (in practice at .39 and above) on the first dimension in the first analysis. To enable the analysis to include all voters for parties (those for independents and 'others' are excluded) the two behavioural measures were coded at 0 when the voter's first choice had no running mates. In addition the ratings measure was reversed to make party dominance a positive score: in table 6 it is a negative score.
The eigen value for the first factor is just over 2. unimportant. The analysis here is intended to be no more than illustrative. We will use a conventional model explaining electoral behaviour. 23 Our expectation is that the model will work poorly in explaining the behaviour of more candidate-centred voters (Whyte, 1974; Laver, 1986; Sinnott 1993, Marsh and Sinnott, 1999) . Ideological issues too are weak (see Laver et al., 1988; c.f. Bowler and Farrell, 1990) and so is the performance of the economyperhaps because it was doing so well. The most significant factors are partisanship and comparative assessments of leaders (Carty, 1981; Harrison and Marsh, 1994 for relatively party-centred voters. This is a considerable difference but, of course, the basis for estimation becomes smaller in the two groups and the variances differ.
Moreover, this distinction between party and candidate is very crude.
A better way to test our contention is to compare the performance of the overall model for several different sub-groups of voters by examining the prediction errors. We can do this most easily by comparing the predictions given by the model against actual party choice and seeing whether predictions are more accurate for more party-centred respondents. Such a comparison is displayed in Figure 1 for voters of all parties (the solid line) as well as for those of Fianna Fáil (dashed line) and Fine Gael (dotted line) alone. A perfect model would predict actual first preference votes with compete certainty (i.e. with a probability of 1.00). If our contention, that this model will be more effective in predicting the votes of more party-centred voters, is correct, then the prediction of actual first preference will come closer to 1.00 as the voter is more party-centred. We have again used the factor scores from the second analysis shown in table 9 to measure degrees of party-centredness, and rounded them to give us a five point scale from -2 (most candidate-centred) to +2 (most party-centred). As The apparent paradox of candidate-centred voting combined with partisan stability at aggregate level is hardly resolved by this analysis. Of course, the paradox p. 23 may be no more than apparent. The party system is becoming much more unstableas we might expect in the absence of strong party anchors in the electorate. Survey evidence points to less party identification (Marsh 2006 ) and aggregate evidence is that levels of partisan solidarity in voting patterns are lower than ever (Gallagher, 2003: 105-6 ) while independent candidates have done unusually well in recent elections. The next Irish election study will provide important evidence on the association between candidate centred voting and partisan stability as it will complete a panel started at the 2002 election. The data will show how far voters who were more party-centred in 2002 actually do remain more faithful to their parties, and show how far candidate-centred voters whose candidate is no longer standing are nonetheless attracted to another candidate of the same party.
It is also possible that the importance of candidate remains overestimated by all the measures used here. Candidate evaluations may be added to the model estimated in Table 10 and each respondent's predicted vote choice calculated, both with candidate evaluations included and again with all candidate evaluations set to zero. The two sets of predictions can then be compared, as Blais at al have done for
Canada. We did this and concluded that only 20 percent of voters would have made a different party choice (with Fine Gael, as might be expected, the biggest loser). 29 This is a simple simulation that pays no attention to the standard errors that surround any such prediction. Nor does it allow for the fact that parties may be liked because of a candidate they nominate. Even so, while the result suggests that the personal vote is more important in Ireland than in Canada, it does at least warn us that candidatecentred voting may be less extensive than is suggested in table 8.
It has also been argued here that differences in the degree to which Irish voters are party-centred indicates a heterogeneity in the electorate that has not been modelled by any analysis to date. This applies whether 20 percent or 40 percent of voters are candidate-centred. While it has been recognised that different Irish voters probably do use different criteria when deciding how to vote, the precise implications of this for multivariate models have not been not pursued. We have seen here that the more candidate-centred the voter, the less easily is his or her vote predicted by a Dalton and Wattenburg (2000) argue this situation itself is changing but their interpretation of party-centred voting is more narrow than that employed here. 7 As the most highly ranked candidates in terms of first preferences win the great majority of seats, success seems largely unaffected by lower preferences. However, this holds only because of the extent to which the distributions of lower preferences are broadly similar to those of first preferences. Also, at most elections there are a number of candidates who owe their election to winning more second and third preferences than first preferences: see Gallagher (1978 Gallagher ( , 1979 . 8 In this context a voter might well use ballot position as a cue, and there is certainly some evidence for this: Robson and Walsh, 1974; Marsh 1987. 9 The simulated ballots lacked the candidate photographs and party logos of the real thing, though they did feature party names. They thus resembled closely the pre-2002 style of ballot. 10 Bowler and Farrell (1991a) called this pattern an 'unravelling' one, in the sense that preferences for a single party's candidates come first, followed by a mixture of candidate and party preferences for the less significant votes. 11 Laver (2004) analysed actual preference data from three constituencies that voted electronically in the 2002 Irish general election. His results appear broadly similar to those from our simulated ballot with respect to the number of preferences expressed and the partisan patterning. The median number of preferences was 3 in Laver's analysis and here. The mean number of preferences was between 4.4 and 5 across the three constituencies Laver examined as opposed to 4 in the election study data. The number we have per constituency is less than 100 but for the three constituencies analysed by Laver mean preferences are lower, being between 3.1 and 3.7. Our respondents were certainly much less likely to complete a full ballot. However, comparing the proportion of FF and FG first preference voters casting a complete and sequential ballot for FF Bowler and Farrell (1991a; 1991b) discovered, consistent pairs are much more common at the top of the ballot with almost three quarters of all such pairs being those between first and second preference and between second and third preferences. Examining all voters who cast at least two preferences, the proportion casting consistent pairs each time are 37 percent, 25 percent, 17 percent, 14 percent and, 9 percent respectively for the first five pairings. 14 The measures in this section come closest to questions found in opinion polls over many years. These ask respondents which of several options best describes the reasons for their choice. Most of the reasons are party and policy related but one is 'picking the best candidate to represent the needs of the constituency'. It is the latter that has chosen by between 40 and 50 percent of respondents over the last twenty years: see Mair, 1987; Sinnott, 1995; Marsh and Sinnott, 1999. 15 The question is: Which would you say was more important in deciding how you cast your first preference vote in the general election Garry et al, 2003; McAllister and O'Connell, 1984; Mair, 1987; Marsh, 1985; Marsh and Sinnott, 1999. 24 These are bi-polar scales. The pairs are: Insist on a united Ireland now -abandon the aim of a united Ireland altogether; Government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services -government should increase taxes a lot and spend more on health and social services; There should be a total ban on abortion in Ireland -abortion should be freely available in Ireland to any woman who wants to have one. 25 Party attachment is measured using the CSES Wave 2 question. 'Leaners' are people who think of themselves a 'close to a political party' but, when asked how close, say they are 'not very close', or who say they are closer to one party than the others. 26 Thinking back over the last five years -the lifetime of the 1997 to 2002 Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat government -would you say the ECONOMY in Ireland over that period of time got a lot better, a little better, stayed the same, got a little worse or got a lot worse? Five response options ranged from 'Got a lot better' to 'Got a lot worse, plus a sixth option, "don't know". This was followed by: Do you think this was MAINLY due to the policies of that government or NOT MAINLY DUE to the policies of that government? 27 The correlations between the raw factor scores measuring candidate vs. party from 
